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re amateur photographs of war and battlefields possible today? 
Or do amateur photographers and their portrayals of war belong 
to a bygone era? Have the provocations of amateur images that 
resist official versions of war been lost to the proliferation of digital 
possibilities, the overwhelming impact of consumer culture, and the 
domination of the mass media? Has the disquieting potential of the 
amateur vanished amid the glut of images of war and violence? If the 
answer to all these questions is no, then how can we identify amateur 
photographs of war? And how do we talk about them in today’s cultural 
climate?
I ask these questions because prima facie the images of war and vio-
lence that flood our screens today do not distinguish between amateur 
and professional. The photographs are taken by whomever arrives first 
at the scene of the crime and happens to post on social media. If they 
are judged to tell a truth about events, the images are edited, reposted, 
appropriated, and reproduced ad infinitum across the Internet. Thanks 
to the availability of technology and its dissemination, photographs 
once recognized as amateur are reused as official witnesses to the lat-
est tragedy. More or less as Walter Benjamin predicted, everyone has 
become an expert when it comes to taking photographs of war and 
violence.1 In addition, news channels and the printed press routinely 
use the photographs of individual citizens, perpetrators, and bystanders 
on account of their apparent authenticity. While the supposed truth is 
inevitably manipulated when amateur images are culled and reedited to 
provide evidence within official reportage—and thus, they forego their 
status as amateur—they are nevertheless passed off as representations of 
what really happened. Their truth value relies on a claim to eye-witness 
immediacy and spontaneous, “uncensored” access to events.2 And so we 
cannot see the difference between amateur and professional war report-
age. It is no longer possible to locate the amateur in the materiality and 
aesthetic. Moreover, the vernacular visions of individual citizens have 
become so convincing that professional journalists routinely appropriate 
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the amateur’s means of photographic production and reproduction in 
order to convey a first-hand, truthful image of war. If amateur photo-
graphs were once identifiably distinct from professional photographs, 
the difference has now become muddied.
As a result, I want to suggest that traditional definitions of amateur 
photographs of war are no longer useful. There was a time when the 
amateur image of war was identified as a site of truth and authenticity 
because it emerged in the blindspots of ideological and political struc-
tures. Today, however, these structures are so tightly controlled that 
they oversee all image production. Amateurs and their photographs 
of war and violence as we knew them from the twentieth century have 
become subservient to technological developments and the political and 
cultural labyrinths of twenty-first-century power. This does not mean 
amateur images of war are no longer produced, rather that they are 
more difficult to find.
In this article I consider two widely known examples of amateur 
photographs as a way to reconceive amateur photography of war and 
violence. The first example, the photographs taken by German soldiers 
in World War II, presents images that fit comfortably within existing 
definitions of the amateur. Indeed, even though these photographs were 
discovered fifty years after being taken, they were produced by and in a 
cultural and historical context that enabled their definition as amateur. 
Specifically, amateur photographs taken by soldiers on the World War II 
battlefield belong to the height of industrial modernity. Simultaneously, 
their status as amateur enables their revelations.
Secondly, I discuss the much-reproduced, debated, critiqued, and re-
viled photographs taken by American soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison 
in Iraq. These photographs were digitally produced in conditions that 
enabled their (unanticipated) dissemination and proliferation. They 
were also disseminated into a visual landscape designed to obfuscate 
the very events portrayed. Unlike the photographs taken by German 
soldiers in the early 1940s, those taken at Abu Ghraib emerged in a 
context that was rigidly controlled in an effort to guarantee the invis-
ibility and, by extension, the absence of images that might contest the 
official version of events. While different from 1940s Europe, the specific 
cultural and historical context, as I will show, enabled the emergence 
of amateur photographs in the Abu Ghraib prison. In turn, what was 
rarely acknowledged at the time was that, once again, it was their status 
as amateur that enabled the heated debate that followed. Thus, despite 
significant differences, the two sets of images share certain key attributes 
and effects. In turn, these characteristics enable both sets of images to 
generate debate. Consequently, the same characteristics offer a new 
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approach to understanding amateur photography of war today. Specifi-
cally, the debates generated by similar images today are more reliable 
indicators of their amateur identity than are their aesthetic and material 
characteristics.
To be clear, I am not making a claim about the specific content of 
the photographs taken by World War II German soldiers or those of 
American soldiers in Abu Ghraib. In both cases, there is an abundance 
of literature that interprets, exposes, and considers their implications. 
Rather, my concern is to juxtapose these images to illuminate their sig-
nificance for a renewed understanding of the amateur photograph of war.
My reconception of the amateur is motivated by a need to embrace 
the shifting function of amateur images in particular, and media images 
more generally, in today’s rapidly changing visual landscape of war and 
violence. Specifically, my reconception shifts away from traditional analy-
ses that focus on what the images look like, what is captured in their 
aesthetic, the identity of the photographer, or whether he or she was 
paid for his or her work. Instead, I focus on how the image is used, the 
effects it enjoys, and the persistent ambiguity of its multiple meanings. 
Most importantly, all of these attributes make sense within the culturally 
and politically determined imagescapes that produce the photographs. By 
focusing on the life of images, their potential to disrupt official visions of 
war and the battlefield, my goal is to find a more adequate approach to 
determining the agency and effect of amateur photographs of war and 
violence today. In turn, this identification and understanding extends 
the meanings generated by the photograph, and places the responsibility 
for its continued agency to reveal, resist, and provoke with us, its viewers. 
Ultimately, I argue that amateur photographs still have the capacity to 
resist the ideological and political control exercized over image produc-
tion and dissemination.3 To recognize this we need a new definition. 
Before that, however, we must understand how amateur images as we 
know them historically were produced and how they operated within 
broader cultural and ideological contexts.4
Amateur Photographs Traditionally Conceived
Amateur photographs of the battlefield were typically produced by 
soldiers, bystanders, witnesses, collaborators, and resisters of modern 
warfare. These images were taken and processed from the battlefields 
of Crimea to those of World War II. I have argued elsewhere that the 
impact of amateur photographs of modern warfare derived from their 
tendency to depict the forbidden and the outlawed. Amateur photo-
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graphs characteristically showed what the powers-that-be would have 
preferred to remain invisible, that is, what was not seen in official images. 
As such, amateur images possessed a capacity to reveal the vulnerability 
of official uses of photography as they bolstered ideology.5 Most often 
amateur photographs achieved this goal irrespective of their diverse 
intentions. Moreover, the power of amateur photography lay in the fact 
that it typically did not consciously set out to expose the invisible: nor 
was it in the habit of direct provocation. Amateur photography up to 
World War II often focused on unanticipated, otherwise-thought-to-be 
inconsequential details that belonged to a context deemed irrelevant 
to the waging of war. Such a context might be, for example, the leisure 
time of soldiers, the building of munitions, or daily life on the home 
front. As we know, the details in amateur images taken in Germany dur-
ing World War II in particular have produced a wealth of information 
about the plans, processes, and execution of warfare. And, in the course 
of their daily lives, amateur photographers sometimes happened to see 
extraordinary events that might otherwise have remained invisible. If 
amateur photography of warfare no longer has this power of exposure, 
the power to make visible the invisible, it is because the image has become 
obsequious to the political and ideological mainstream manipulation of 
images. In turn, the most urgent question becomes: where can we find 
images of the invisible today? The question is urgent because, as Jacques 
Rancière would have it, making visible and sayable what is otherwise 
invisible and silent is a powerful way to resist—in this case—the official, 
ideologically manipulative vision of war. 6
Rancière’s argument for “making sensible,” that is to say, available to 
the senses, what is otherwise not available to social discourse, is politically 
and socially motivated. Rancière’s concern is to create the possibility of 
public discourse for and about that which otherwise has no social identity 
or no reality within space and time.7 Moreover, according to Rancière, 
this is made possible through art, by means of an aesthetic that is both 
“revealing” and “experimental.” It must be both, because art’s function 
is to disturb the given (visible) fields of possibility. Rancière doesn’t say 
as much, but the assumption is that organizational systems and social 
divisions can comfortably accommodate art that maintains exclusions, 
invisibility, unsayability, and inaudibility. That is, without disturbance, 
the practice of art is not political. Most important for Rancière is that 
the aesthetic and political fields are reorganized, or reconfigured, as a 
result of the invisible made visible, the inaudible made audible, and the 
nonsubject given subjectivity. According to Rancière, it is only art that 
has the capacity to effect this change.
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The politics of works of art plays itself out to a larger extent . . . in the recon-
figuration of worlds of experience based on which police consensus or political 
dissensus are defined. It plays itself out in the way in which modes of narration 
or new forms of visibility established by artistic practices enter into politics’ own 
field of aesthetic possibilities. . . . It is up to the various forms of politics to ap-
propriate, for their own proper use, the modes of presentation or the means 
of establishing explanatory sequences produced by artistic practices rather than 
the other way around.8
As I show through my two examples, amateur photographs of wars past 
had the capacity to generate public discourse through making visible, 
just as Rancière would want them to. Of key importance to this discourse 
is the availability of different, conflicting, and contradictory opinions. It 
is not enough for so-called art to make a persuasive counterargument, 
as this inevitably leads to a reestablished hierarchy. Making visible in 
Rancière’s discourse must result in animated debate and a continued 
lack of consensus regarding people who have been deprived of identity, 
subjectivity, and visibility. In a postindustrial moment, political art must 
enable the excluded (by which Rancière means industrial workers and 
the economically disenfranchised) to speak for themselves and to have 
their voices heard as individuals. In short, making visible happens as a 
result of debate.
However, the way that photography achieves this—and herein lies my 
location of amateurness in the two examples—is not through what Ran-
cière calls experimentation. Rather, the amateur photograph possesses an 
ambiguity or fluidity that ensures its continued revelation of the invisible 
at the margins of visibility as long as amateur images circulate within a 
community that, if not entirely familiar to the photographer, is connected 
by degrees of separation. That is, amateur images may fall into obscurity, 
resurface, be reused or not. However, within this proximate community 
they maintain an invisibility that can make visible what institutions prefer 
to remain invisible. They have this agency because each reiteration brings 
with it a new context, a new audience, and, therefore, new meanings. 
The ineffability of meaning in amateur images simultaneously allows for 
multiple, contradictory, and irresolvable interpretations. And yet, when 
amateur images are reedited, redeployed, redisseminated to accord with 
the institutional structures that create exclusion and invisibility, they are 
no longer amateur. To fix meaning through definitive manipulation is 
to place the amateur image in the service of invisibility. It goes without 
saying that not all amateur photographs have this capacity to expose, to 
make visible the subjects of exclusion, stigmatization, and victimization. 
Just as for Rancière, not all images can play this social and political role.
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Before looking at this critical tension between visibility and invisibility, 
between the sayable and the unsayable, as it is manifest in the amateur 
photographs of World War II and Abu Ghraib, I want to reflect on the 
ideas of another theorist of photography, Ariella Azoulay. In her ground-
breaking work, Azoulay argues that our task as critics of photography 
is to turn away from a focus on how images make meaning within the 
frame. Instead, Azoulay argues that we are responsible for accessing the 
meaning of the photograph as it functions within a contextual circuit. 
The spectator is charged with completing “the civil contract” between 
the photographer, the photographed, and the spectator. To explain 
this by way of example, Azoulay discusses press photographs of crimes 
committed against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. She shows 
how photographs of children, women, Palestinian taxi drivers, and oth-
ers—people who are stateless, without identity, voice, or citizenship in 
the West Bank—give a voice to these same people. When press photo-
graphs of them are passed around (which includes being passed on to 
us as spectators of the image, for example, in a Reuters report), a com-
munity is established. The community coheres around the photograph, 
and comprises the press photographer, the people photographed, and 
viewers. In turn, the stateless are given a form of “civil citizenry.” Azoulay 
calls this “the civil contract of photography.”9 The Palestinian victims 
are not just made visible, but are given an identity and a subjectivity 
within the community established by photography. Azoulay argues that 
“photography, being in principle accessible to all, bestows universal 
citizenship on a new citizenry whose citizens produce, distribute, and 
look at images.”10 Communities of citizens are also created by amateur 
photography. However, only one aspect of Azoulay’s discussion interests 
me here: our role in the created community. Accordingly, this is defined 
by our responsibility as spectators to look at what is otherwise invisible 
and to identify the citizens of photography. If we follow the logic of 
Azoulay’s argument, together with the political image as it is conceived 
by Rancière, then when we look at amateur images of war, we discover 
multiple different spectators, multiple meanings, and, in turn, the rise 
of a public debate that disorders.
If we can agree that we now live in a historical moment when the private 
and personal have been erased by the transformed dimensions of war 
and modernity; if we agree that war is on our doorsteps and embroiled 
in our daily lives, then we have to acknowledge that these erasures have 
taken with them the force of amateur photography as we once knew 
it.11 Given this situation, we must focus on how to see and understand 
alternative, noncommercial, and so-called private images, what we do 
with them, and what we need to know in order to harness their power. 
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It is imperative that we find and recognize the moments of invisibility 
made visible by amateur images of war if we are to take responsibility. 
Photographs that do what amateur images of war once did are still be-
ing produced by citizens every day. To recognize them, we must first see 
“amateur” through this new lens as I lay it out: we must consider how 
images are used, the effect they enjoy, the debates they generate, and 
the communities that form around them. Even though these amateur 
images may be visually indistinguishable from those used in the press 
and other public, government-sanctioned institutions, with a renewed 
approach, as spectators, we will be able to expose the invisible traces of 
war. The question is no longer what is and is not an amateur image, but 
rather, how we as creators and viewers of photographs of war see and 
understand the narratives and communities that form around them.
Amateur Photography, War, and the Modern Battlefield
German soldiers’ photographs in World War II accord with traditional 
definitions of the amateur. The amateur was born of industrial moderni-
ty.12 In their earliest identities, amateur scientists, aesthetes, philosophers, 
and photographers belonged to polite, bourgeois society. Similarly, from 
the beginning, amateurs typically practiced their art productively and 
creatively, within a community, and never for financial or professional 
gains.13 The amateur was a bourgeois individual who pursued a pastime 
with fervor and passion, taking his or her interest seriously and, in the 
case of photography, belonging to a club of like-minded people practic-
ing their passion. By the late nineteenth century, these clubs produced 
newsletters or journals in which tips and instructions on how to improve 
were given to members. The clubs held equipment for taking and de-
veloping photographs, and provided opportunity for self-betterment 
through engagement in activities and excursions for members.
Simultaneously, in the mid-nineteenth century when industrialization 
was growing rapidly and photography was invented, time was measured 
by the length of the day at the factory. This created the opportunity and 
desire for leisure and entertainment: another defining characteristic of 
industrial modernity with deep connections to the rise of the amateur. 
Leisure time was occupied with meaningful pursuits that were neverthe-
less unrelated to work. In keeping with the pursuit of an amateur activ-
ity outside of the frame of the rationalization of daily life, the amateur 
also worked outside of institutionalized taste and aesthetics, and was 
free of the demands of culture.14 Amateurs pursued their pastime as a 
leisure activity, but they did so with serious commitment. The manner 
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in which the activity was carried out and the frame of collectivity went 
together with the identification of an “impoverished aesthetic” as the 
means of distinguishing amateur photography that so many critics have 
held onto ever since.15
This culture of amateur photography was expanding at the very same 
moment that the modern battlefield, with its repeating rifles, mecha-
nized tanks, and instruments of navigation, was being defined.16 Roger 
Fenton took his camera to record events on the Crimean battlefield in 
1854. He was among the first to do so, and he was an amateur. Though 
encouraged by the prince consort, he was not commissioned, he was not 
paid, and his images were not made for exhibition, to persuade, or to 
manipulate a nation. From these beginnings within industrial modernity, 
war and photography were united through the pursuits of amateurs. It 
is true that photography was not dependent on the battlefield and was 
practiced equally on the home front. However, war and photography 
influenced each other’s development thanks to their marriage with the 
advance of late-nineteenth-century modernity.
Photography and the modern battlefield continued to expand together 
with other technologies: cameras, repeating rifles, lenses, viewfinders, 
machine engineering, and flying machines. Indeed, Zygmunt Bauman 
identifies the most extreme articulation of industrial modernity—World 
War II and the Holocaust—as consolidating their marriage.17 Photography 
was used by every facet of the Nazi machinery to document, strategize, 
publicize, and coerce. Even before World War II, the use of official and 
propaganda photography in wartime was evident: to make an ideological 
argument, to convince the nation, to create national identity, to enlist 
and motivate potential soldiers, to keep the truth about war hidden from 
view.18 As others have argued about different historical and theoreti-
cal contexts, the official images of industrial warfare have always been 
most successful when they have made the violence of war invisible.19 To 
reiterate, invisibility is the common goal of official war photography. 
Official images claim visibility but manifest invisibility. Those produced 
by the Nazi Ministry of Propaganda do exactly this: crowds in purpose-
built stadiums, the Führer accepting a bouquet from a blond-haired 
child, the lithe machinelike bodies of soldiers in uniform, raising flags 
in displays of unswerving devotion to the nation and its war effort. Most 
significantly, the absence of death, destruction, violence, and aggression 
from the image was necessary to the successful sale of Hitler’s war to 
the nation.20 The dos and don’ts of photography in Nazi Germany were 
known to all. Censorship laws were put in place.21
The goal of amateur photography in World War II has always been 
less clear. When looking at the hundreds of thousands of photographs 
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taken by German and Allied World War II soldiers, there are always ques-
tions. Who took the photograph? What is this photograph depicting? 
Where was it taken? What was the photographer’s intention? Where was 
it processed? How did it find its way to the place where I am seeing it? 
And the questions continue. The information recorded by the amateur 
photograph is often no less elusive thanks to its characteristic distance: 
the distance of the photographer from the events depicted, the distance 
created by the time that has lapsed between when the photograph was 
taken and when it is made public, and again, between its publication 
and the moment I look at it. There are further distances created by the 
multiple (and potentially conflicting) narratives of interpretation that 
are made possible thanks to these first three levels of distance.22 Ama-
teur photographs taken by World War II soldiers, for example, were not 
made for publication; they were not taken for distribution outside of the 
soldier’s immediate circles, and they were typically stored in attics at the 
end of the war. Their visions were subjective, their meanings remained 
private, and as objects they remained absent for a generation. Thus, 
kept within this limited circle, the photographs were invisible to those 
outside the circle. Of course, they were also passed around, given away, 
reprinted as postcards, written on, and pasted in other soldiers’ albums. 
However, the new context changed the significance of such amateur im-
ages, sometimes erasing the meaning of their previous reproductions.
Many of the questions raised by amateur photographs taken during 
World War II are due to their proliferation—in turn, a result of their 
production within modernity. The abundance of amateur photographs 
results from the development of lightweight, portable cameras and the 
German government’s belief that the soldiers’ photographs would ad-
vance the war effort. German soldiers, for example, were given cameras 
as part of their equipment and were also issued instructions on how 
and what to photograph. They were given incentives in the form of 
competitions, with winning entries being published in one of the official 
arms of the Nazi press. The Ministry of Propaganda recognized in the 
unsuspecting photograph proof of the great German nation, the pure 
German subject, the superiority of the German army. The photographs 
were, of course, edited where necessary prior to publication. When they 
were publicly held up as examples of Nazi ideology, the photographs 
ceased to function as amateur photographs.23 It must also be remembered 
that when published in the weekly Nazi journals, they no longer made 
visible the invisibility created through ideological manipulation. Rather, 
their persuasive message took over the photographs in this new context.
Yet the German administration did not anticipate that as amateurs, 
the soldiers would take photographs in their leisure time, in addition to 
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those that were requisitioned as part of their service. The soldiers and 
officers armed with cameras took photographs wherever they went: they 
were often uncensored, made anonymously, bought and sold, passed 
around, swapped, sent home to sweethearts and families as proof of the 
soldier’s health and well-being. Such uses of the amateur photograph 
also differentiated it from the official.
However, unbeknownst to soldiers at the time, their photographs 
also made visible what was otherwise invisible to themselves and those 
at home. The soldier-photographers’ single most important goal was to 
create photographic records of the visual reality before them. They saw 
different things. Like tourists, the soldiers photographed “exotic” peoples 
in strange lands, violent deeds, and unusual events—such as hangings, 
mass murders, and open burials. They also photographed the locals: dirty, 
in threadbare clothes, suffering. Amateur photographs saw what was not 
in the interests of the advancement of the German war effort. True to 
the ambiguity and fluidity of amateur photographs, these images could 
easily be appropriated, designed to show the less-than-humanness of the 
“enemy” as vermin. Moreover, the soldiers did not anticipate that their 
photographs would be seen differently, and their crimes made visible, 
by their children and by a generation ready to discuss the complexity 
of Germany’s involvement in the war fifty years later. This ability to be 
read in different ways creates an instability of meaning in amateur pho-
tographs that underlies their tendency to make visible what is invisible, 
as well as to maintain the obscurity of their own agenda.
The absences in the photographs allowed them to be passed over by 
censors: their significance was either ignored or minimized if and when 
they were seen by Nazi officials. At times the photographs were censored; 
however, the only difference between censored and uncensored was an 
official stamp on the back. There were no great consequences for cen-
sored images because the authorities didn’t understand their potential 
to disrupt the propagated ideology.24 It was believed the amateur im-
ages would not be seen by anyone who mattered, that is, by the Allied 
governments and their people. Soldiers’ amateur images thus operated 
outside of or at the edge of constraints. This enabled them to witness 
what they were not supposed to: death, destruction, horrendous crimes 
that could not be and were not otherwise imagined. They saw things 
that were meant to be invisible: the home army committing public 
humiliations, lynchings, shootings on the side of the road and in the 
center of towns. All of this changed when they were discovered by the 
soldiers’ families and brought to public attention with their exhibition 
in 1995 at the Hamburg Institute for Social Research. As a result of the 
exhibition, the photographs stirred a controversy that continued for a 
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decade.25 The same photographs were seen, fifty years after the fact, as 
evidence of an army bringing shame on the German nation. That is, fifty 
years later the amateur photograph exposed the vulnerability of official 
uses of warfare and photography in World War II. These amateur images 
exposed the cracks not fully visible within the Nazi ideology when they 
showed what had never been captured by official photography. However, 
this only happened when the soldier’s next of kin in the next generation 
made them visible. By extension, these amateur images always had the 
potential to create havoc with, rather than conviction in, or support of, 
ideological arguments for the efficiency, organization, and imperative 
of modern warfare.
Seventy years later, we look back at these photographs and see the 
amateur image at its most effective, its most resistant, its most conceptually 
discrete. It was distinct from the images produced by professional and 
official photography units sent by the German and Allied governments to 
record events at the Front. However, we must remember that this claim is 
only possible in retrospect, because the photographs taken at the Front 
remained invisible to the public eye for a generation. It was not until the 
soldiers began to die and their relatives found the photographs in attics 
and cellars across Germany that we learned of their existence. Between 
their creation during World War II and their discovery in the 1990s, the 
amateur images were understood as mementos and private keepsakes 
of the soldiers’ time on the battlefield. It was the next generation that 
took on the responsibility to make visible what was otherwise kept invis-
ible about World War II. They used the photographs to question the 
citizenship of the soldiers and to grant it to those who had been without 
subjectivity in the 1940s: those persecuted by the Nazis. Furthermore, I 
would argue that what gave these amateur photographs the capacity to 
challenge the not-yet-laid-to-rest narratives of German history was their 
ambiguity. Their most impressive provocation was not simply that they 
made visible what had always been kept invisible. Rather, it was that 
they ignited a public controversy. Aging soldiers, their adult children, 
museum curators, the German public, international audiences, Jewish 
survivors, and Polish bystanders all had different opinions regarding the 
meanings of the photographs. It was the vociferous debates spawned 
by these amateur photographs that effectively gave them the power to 
make audible what had never previously been heard.
From the outset, the amateur photographs look different aestheti-
cally. They were usually made with less expensive equipment, and, 
most significantly, they were not manipulated in processing or edited 
in postproduction. Thus, these vernacular photographs taken at the 
Front are identifiable as amateur in a traditional sense. Unlike the 
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official photographs, they are also marked by mistakes and flaws, over- 
and underexposure, and objects and people in the distant background 
or at least off-center. When the images were discovered in the 1990s, 
these apparent imperfections guaranteed the photographs were telling 
the truth. For the World War II soldiers, no guarantee was needed: the 
photograph was handed around to friends, across communities, to family 
on the home front, for all to see. They were used to create a community 
of citizens, people with an identity created by the photograph.
Nevertheless, there is still more to be seen in these amateur photo-
graphs today, seventy years later. As we now know, they exposed the lies 
of the official images of the war. In spite and because of their multiple 
interpretations, they cracked the hermetic seal of Nazi ideology. And 
simultaneously, if unawares, they told the truth of what the soldiers were 
doing on the battlefield. The photographs made visible the soldiers’ own 
crimes. And because of the integral distance of amateur photographs, 
these crimes were contested. Disagreement, public outrage, and a wealth 
of discursive representation reveal World War II soldiers’ amateur photo-
graphs as a site at which the efficiency and instrumentality of modernity 
began to erode in the 1990s.26
Amateur Photographs of War Redacted
If the soldiers’ snaps of World War II are illustrative of the critical 
but conveniently invisible relationship between amateur photography 
and resistance to war in modernity, the role of images on and off the 
battlefield changed with the Vietnam War. In Vietnam, what was meant 
to stay invisible was revealed for all to see. The only difference was that it 
was done by government-deployed photographers and news cameramen. 
Photographers paid by the state and the official media took images of 
the horrific violence of American soldiers toward other soldiers, Viet-
namese civilians, and their homes. Never before had such sights been 
disseminated so widely and been met with such horror at the home 
front. The images made and sold for mass consumption made visible 
what was supposed to remain invisible. And their immediate visibility 
was largely thanks to the government’s misunderstanding of advances 
in image technology: namely, the role that still and moving images 
could play in the public imaginary. The burning of My Lai, women and 
children lying in cinders on the side of the road; Nick Ut’s photograph 
of the naked child screaming helplessly, running away from a napalm 
strike; and Eddie Adams’s photograph of the South Vietnamese police 
chief killing the Viet Cong suspect Nguyen Van Lem in Saigon in 1968 
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became the icons by which we define the Vietnam War. They exposed 
lies and made visible what those whose interest it was to perpetuate the 
war intended to keep invisible. Moreover, they were all professionally 
produced photographs.
When the US went to war to fight the next invisible enemy in Iraq, 
the Bush administration ensured the same mistakes were not repeated.27 
The waging of war and the role of photography became more tightly 
entwined than ever.28 In Iraq, still and moving photographic images 
were used to justify the waging of the Persian Gulf War. Images were 
used strategically to keep citizens at home in the US blind to the truth 
of what was taking place on the battlefield in Iraq. Citizens were desig-
nated audiences to a performance. As Barbie Zelizer, among others, so 
eloquently argues, from 1990 war was transformed into an image.29 From 
the war’s outbreak, all we knew of it were the photographs that appeared 
in the media. Other writers have pointed out that the sanctioning of 
images from the battlefield has led to a situation in which the enemy is 
only known through the images he creates. Boris Groys, for example, 
claims without reserve in his discussion of Osama bin Laden’s use of 
video that as a result of the expanded role of images in war, the terrorist 
no longer waits for his acts to be represented, but that “the act of war 
itself coincides here with its documentation, with its representation. 
The function of art as a medium of representation and the role of the 
artist as a mediator between reality and memory are here completely 
eliminated.”30 The controlled image-deployment exercised by the first 
Bush administration in carrying out Operation Desert Storm eventually 
led to the so-called perpetrator taking over the role of the amateur in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. By 2004, at the height of the ongoing “War 
on Terror,” the terrorist perpetrator occupied the only space apparently 
left uncolonized by the media.31 He documented his own body in hiding.
The official images of Operation Desert Storm were carefully censored, 
sanctioned, and sanitized: the view of cameras on smart bombs with 
not a human being in sight were fed back home to the nightly news. 
Documentaries were made for prime time television of the tanks and 
technologies that had been designed with precision to ensure American 
success in the Gulf. Heavily censored news broadcasts from reporters in 
Baghdad provided all the information that audiences needed to know. 
The US led the way to a new era of clean, surgically precise warfare. 
The directives on taking photographs were clear: the war was to be kept 
invisible, the truth conveniently withheld. We all knew there had to be 
blood somewhere in Iraq, but the only narrative made visible was that 
of the heavily censored images that came back from the battlefield. If 
there were signs of destruction, they were reminiscent of World War I 
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photographs of explosions on a horizon, or aerial shots of indistinct 
pockmarked landscapes. Alternatively, the pyrotechnics of flashing lights 
seen through the filter of night vision glasses were thrilling rather than 
devastating.32
And then, in 2003, as young George W. Bush was finishing off the 
task begun by his father in Iraq, Sergeant Joe Darby handed a series 
of photographs taken by a “few bad apples” at Abu Ghraib prison to 
Army Criminal Investigation Command. The photographs of soldiers as 
spectators and performers in violent abuses against Iraqi prisoners were 
published by CBS News in April 2004. The Iraq War changed course, 
domestic confidence waned, and the world was repulsed. The Abu Ghraib 
photographs of piles of naked prisoners, a man on a dog leash, and a 
prisoner hooded with his hands and genitals connected to electrodes 
began to trickle out and then quickly streamed onto the Internet via 
The Washington Post and The New Yorker.33
Early interpretations of the Abu Ghraib images stressed their revela-
tion of a peculiarly American immorality, their betrayal of the American 
malaise that fueled invasion and occupation in Iraq. Susan Sontag, for 
example, famously claimed that the perpetrator photographs of torture 
at Abu Ghraib prison were rare because the torturer was included in 
the photograph. Only a contemporary American soldier could turn 
cold-blooded violence into a spectacle of which he or she was proud. 
Nevertheless, the trophy photographs taken on the battlefields of World 
War II repeatedly showed soldiers and their victims together in the same 
image. Often the soldiers from Germany of another era struck identical 
poses beside their victims.34 There were many other resonances between 
those taken by German soldiers in the early 1940s and the Abu Ghraib 
photographs. For example, both sets of images were never meant to be 
released to the world. They were private images of daily events made for 
a community of soldiers and their friends and families at home. There 
were of course differences, but these differences were not in kind. For 
example, the temporal distance between when the Abu Ghraib photo-
graphs were taken and their exposure to the world was considerably less 
than the time it took for the German soldiers’ images to surface. The 
Abu Ghraib photographs took a few months rather than decades. That 
the images were taken indoors, in color and close up, digitally produced 
and disseminated, also made the crimes depicted seem more outrageous.
In kind, however, these images are no different from those I discuss 
above. They are photographs taken by soldier-photographers that record 
daily life in the prison. In addition, the Abu Ghraib photographs were 
reportedly used in the exact same manner as those taken by German 
soldiers in World War II: as keepsakes, passed around by soldiers to 
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other soldiers within the unit as a document of their activities.35 As was 
the case on the World War II Eastern Front, ordinary lives were made 
extraordinary by the context of war, and unimaginable events were part 
of the everyday. The photographs created a community of soldier-citizens. 
Once they were published, however, the communities that gathered 
around them multiplied, and thus their meanings proliferated. It hap-
pened much faster than in Germany, and there was no need to wait for 
a new generation to discover them; but again, these photographs told 
a story the world was not expecting. They revealed a reality that was 
nowhere in the official images of the war. True to their status as ama-
teur images, they did not set out to make visible the invisible horrors 
of war, to make sayable what could never have otherwise been uttered. 
The soldiers could not have anticipated that their images would receive 
such widespread dissemination and surely would never have imagined 
their own exposure as perpetrators of unimaginable crimes.
Like those of their German counterparts sixty years earlier, the Abu 
Ghraib photographs are amateur and thus open to multiple interpreta-
tions. Although in the months following their publication, they were seen 
as representing one thing, the horror resulting from violent acts by US 
soldiers at Abu Ghraib, public outrage was not the only reaction. As time 
went on, their meaning and significance shifted, and they became fiercely 
debated. And as Dora Apel suggests, there are further interpretations 
still to come.36 The fluidity and ambiguity of their meanings make them 
available for appropriation—to be seen by communities as diverse as low-
level soldiers, the Bush administration, Iraqi prisoners, Iraqi protesters 
of American occupation, or readers of The New Yorker.37 Each new viewer 
generated by these appropriations sees a different image, in a different 
context, further complicating the issues raised by the existence of the 
photographs. A heated and prolonged public discourse was generated 
about what was otherwise unsayable: the lies and crimes, complex and 
multifaceted, that were fiercely concealed in the US’s denial of its own 
responsibility for its occupation activities in Iraq. Moreover, it was the 
culture of war as a performance of images that gave Abu Ghraib soldiers 
the right to take these photographs. The clinically sanitized wars in Iraq 
were stained by the revelations of amateur photographs that were meant 
to remain private. In addition, the Pentagon and the White House could 
never have anticipated the force of digital imagery. In 2003 the ready 
accessibility of digital images, from production to dissemination, had 
not yet been realized.
Once the photographs were in the public sphere, being simultaneously 
edited and reused for diverse public protests, arguments proliferated 
regarding their content. Some claimed they were staged for the camera, 
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others that they were faked, and still others that they were point-and-
shoot documents. In interviews Lynndie England, the young woman in a 
number of the photographs, claimed that she was under the sway of her 
lover, Charles Graner, and that she posed with corpses and humiliated 
Iraqi prisoners because she was following Graner’s wishes to receive his 
approval.38 She denied any involvement in the activities that led to the 
display of violence in the photographs.39 In another highly debated issue, 
while it was clear that these images evidenced horrific crimes, there was 
no consensus over who was to blame. Was the soldier in the photograph 
responsible, or was the real culprit the one who committed the crimes 
in the first place? Perhaps responsibility lay with the photographer? In 
addition, when the victims were interviewed, they gave testimonies that 
contradicted those of the soldiers.40 And what of the Bush administration 
that had not only sanctioned torture, but required it? And the superiors 
who had turned a blind eye? Janis Karpinski was in command of the unit, 
but what about the Pentagon and Donald Rumsfeld, who knew of and 
had authorized the use of torture against prisoners? Or Bush himself, 
who claimed that it was an isolated incident committed by “a few bad 
apples?” What exactly were these photographs witness to?41
The questions raised by these photographs were infinite. The dis-
courses that surrounded them are quite different from those generated 
by the German Wehrmacht photographs, primarily because the war in 
question was still being carried out when they came to public attention. 
But nevertheless, like the debate ignited by the German soldiers’ photo-
graphs, a controversy raged. In spite of all the differences from amateur 
photographs of the past, and for all the unanswered and unanswerable 
questions, the result of the controversy they stirred was fundamentally 
the same: they made visible what the authorities would have preferred 
to stay invisible. They showed that violations of human rights were ram-
pant in the Abu Ghraib prison. For all of the questions surrounding the 
photographs taken by World War II German soldiers, the same could 
be said: they showed that crimes took place.
The photographs taken by soldiers at Abu Ghraib continue to fulfill 
the criteria of amateur images as I have reconceived them: war and its 
image become one and the same thing. Even as they raise questions 
that cannot be answered, the amateur photographs redefined the war, 
its perpetrators, and its victims. And as was the case with the Verbrechen 
der Wehrmacht (Crimes of the German Army) exhibition in 1995, as the 
exhibition and dissemination of the Abu Ghraib photographs broadened, 
the issues became increasingly complex.42 With each new community 
of spectators, new forms of symbolic citizenship (in Azoulay’s sense) 
were created by these photographs. Beyond the low-level soldiers, the 
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images gave citizenship and identity to the prisoners and to Iraqi people 
victimized by American soldiers. To reiterate, it was because the reins 
on image production and dissemination in the decades of the Iraq wars 
were so tightly held that the space for their articulation as amateur was 
possible. The assiduity of attempts to control official images is what cre-
ated the possibility of amateur photographs that could challenge and 
contest.43 Similarly, the actions of the soldiers created public discourse 
and invited multiple spectators to complete the interpretation with a 
goal of reorganizing and reconfiguring the status quo.
Even though in 2003 we had apparently reached a historical moment 
when “there is no reality, just images” of war, the example of Abu Ghraib 
proved otherwise.44 Even though by 2003 amateur images had no power 
to challenge a nation’s involvement in war, even though there was no 
apparent space for amateur images as they had functioned at the height 
of modernity, the digital photographs taken by soldiers at Abu Ghraib 
were able to do just this. Each reinvention of the way the images are 
used, each edition and consequent exhibition of these photographs, 
continues to be unanticipated. The proliferating amateur image con-
tinues to keep secrets even as it exposes others. These photographs are 
evidence, above all, that as mass culture continues to subsume all image 
production, the possibility of cracks and fissures still exists. Thanks to 
its distance and, especially, its distinction from images in the service of 
official ideology, the amateur cannot be pinned down.
Amateur Photographs of War Today
Over the past fifteen years, the distinctions that supported the perpetu-
ation of war and violence within industrial modernity—homefront and 
battlefield, perpetrator and victim, soldier and civilian—have continued 
to erode. War no longer takes place in a circumscribed geographical 
arena. The onetime homefront has become the battlefield. In European 
democracies such as France and Germany, soldiers armed with Kalash-
nikovs patrol streets lined with sixteenth-century architecture that are 
home to locals and stops on the tourist map. The visible and audible 
markers of the battlefield have become a part of daily life: military 
soldiers, guns, sirens. Borders are more assiduously patrolled, but the 
enemy remains on the inside: it cannot be predicted, cannot be seen, 
cannot be traced. The enemy soldier is fully invisible. In terms of time, 
as well as space, the lines between war and peace have been permanently 
erased. The “war without end against no readily definable enemy” is be-
ing played out in full force on the streets of European cities.45
new literary history70
In keeping with this situation, the images through which today’s wars 
are known and understood have become integrated into the fabric of 
the everyday. The news updates run 24/7, messages flash on our screens 
and sing out on our telephones when someone is killed. The unending 
footage of atrocities alerts us to the ongoing wars. Moreover, with the 
shifts in modern warfare, the distinction between amateur and profes-
sional as we once knew it has become too complicated to uphold.46 The 
amateur and professional now work in tandem, and their products are 
visually interchangeable: together they create the imagescape through 
which wars are known. With porous borders, the rapid growth of the 
Internet, and access to images, globalization, and the proliferation of 
technology, there is no beginning or end to images that are neither 
and both amateur and professional. Every image is produced within 
the framework of consumer culture. Even when private individuals take 
photographs of streets that have become a battlefield, they do so to post 
on social media, to show the world what they see. These platforms per-
form the censorship, ensuring that photographs are edited, taken down, 
deleted, or masked. The personal has become more political than ever. 
And yet, the unpredictability and fluidity of the individual’s perspective, 
the amateur vision, has been removed. The amateur’s edge has been 
blunted. The amateur has apparently been subsumed by technological 
advance and, most ironically, by the spread and proliferation of war.47
So the question remains, if we want to continue to harness the power 
of amateur images of war, how and where can we locate their act of 
making visible what is meant to remain invisible? Where can we find the 
images that will generate debate where none is otherwise possible? Even 
if we don’t call them amateur, we need to recognize images of war that 
resist by undermining the visions of governments and bureaucracies. 
We need to recognize photographs that play with, confuse, or ignite 
discourse through exposing the invisible, particularly when they occupy 
the margins of visibility. That is, particularly, when the questions they 
raise have no resolution.48
Photographs of resistance and their revelation within the public sphere 
take time to emerge. Even those taken at Abu Ghraib did not come to 
public attention immediately. In addition, because the imagescape con-
tinues to mutate and simultaneously expand, the cracks within it will take 
more time to locate. Thus, the present cultural context is one in which 
amateur images of war appear continuous with the media and have lost 
their force. The collapse of the infrastructural forms and factors that 
enabled war in modernity, the forms and factors that enabled amateur 
images in World War II, and those that took us by surprise in 2004, have 
changed the visual representation of war irrevocably. Nevertheless, im-
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ages filled with ambiguity and an impetus to expose and make visible, 
to create alternative communities, will still emerge. Accordingly, when 
amateur photographs do arise, a focus on their unpredictability, fluidity, 
and ambiguity is a place to begin identification and analysis. In turn, the 
ineffability that plays out in the tension between visibility and invisibility 
within the various communities—or citizens—created by amateur im-
ages will be key to debate and their power to reorganize. Ultimately, it 
is the effects they have, the lives they lead, and the debates they ignite 
that make amateur images critically essential to the imagescape of war 
and violence in the twenty-first century.
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